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We incorporated behavioral and computational modeling techniques to examine age-based
differences in strategy use in two four-choice decision-making tasks. Healthy older (aged
60–82 years) and younger adults (aged 18–23 years) performed one of two decision-making
tasks that differed in the degree to which rewards for each option depended on the choices
made on previous trials. In the choice-independent task rewards for each choice were not
affected by the sequence of previous choices that had beenmade. In contrast, in the choice-
dependent task rewards for each option were based on how often each option had been
chosen in the past.We compared the ﬁts of a model that assumes the use of a win-stay–
lose-shift (WSLS) heuristic to make decisions, to the ﬁts of a reinforcement-learning (RL)
model that compared expected reward values for each option to make decisions. Younger
adultswere best ﬁt by the RLmodel, while older adults showed signiﬁcantlymore evidence
of being best ﬁt by theWSLS heuristic model. This led older adults to perform worse than
younger adults in the choice-independent task, but better in the choice-dependent task.
These results coincide with previous work in our labs that also found better performance for
older adults in choice-dependent tasks (Worthy et al., 2011), and the present results suggest
that qualitative age-based differences in the strategies used in choice tasks may underlie
older adults’ advantage in choice-dependent tasks. We discuss possible factors behind
these differences such as neurobiological changes associated with aging, and increased
use of heuristics by older adults.
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INTRODUCTION
The US population is aging at a very high rate. By 2050 developed
nations are projected to have substantially higher populations of
older adults (26% of the population) than children under age
15 (16%; Cohen, 2003). It is thus very important to develop a
deep understanding of how aging affects cognition and behavior.
One task that both younger and older adults must undertake on a
daily basis is decision-making.Older adults often continue towork
in important jobs, and even those who retire must make impor-
tant choices that will affect their well-being and the well-being
of their posterity. There has recently been a surge in excellent
research aimed at understanding decision-making across the lifes-
pan (Kovalchik et al., 2004; Wood et al., 2005; Mata et al., 2007;
Peters et al., 2007; Samanez-Larkin et al., 2007, 2011; Schott et al.,
2007; Brown and Ridderinkhof, 2009).
One important aspect of decision-making is that decisions can
rarely be considered as isolated events. Rather, our decisions often
affect what possibilities are available in the future. For example,
the choices of whether to attend college, what college to attend,
and what to major in will affect what job prospects are available
to choose from in the future. Likewise, the choices regarding how
to invest and save for retirement will eventually affect the class
of retirement homes that are available to choose from. It is thus
important to examine how people make decisions based not only
on their immediate effects, but also based on how the present
decisions will affect future possibilities.
A recent study from our lab suggests that older adults may
actually be better than younger adults in situations where rewards
are choice-dependent (Worthy et al., 2011). Choice-dependent
decision-making situations are similar to the examples presented
above where the rewards available from the various options in the
environment depend on the sequence of choices made in the past.
In contrast, in choice-independent situations the rewards avail-
able from the options in the environment are not affected by the
choices made in the recent past. In choice-independent laboratory
paradigms the rewards available for each option on each trial are
usually set by the experimenter and often vary arbitrarily based
on the trial number. Many of the decision-making tasks that have
been used to examine how aging affects decision-making incorpo-
rate choice-independent reward structures. This is true for tasks
like the Iowa Gambling task (Denburg et al., 2005), the Behav-
ioral Investment Allocation Strategy task (Kuhnen and Knutson,
2005; Samanez-Larkin et al., 2010), the Monetary Incentive Delay
task (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2007), and the Probabilistic Object
Reversal Task (Mell et al., 2005, 2009). A common ﬁnding in
these tasks is poorer or, at aminimum, equivalent performance for
older adults compared to younger adults. Thus, older adults have
been shown to outperform younger adults on choice-dependent
tasks, whereas younger adults may outperform older adults on
choice-independent tasks (Worthy et al., 2011).
One reason for this interaction between age and the reward
structure of the task on decision-making performance may be an
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age related shift in the neural areas recruited during decision-
making. A number of studies have shown that normal aging leads
to structural and functional declines in a number of brain regions
including the striatum, cerebellum, hippocampus, and prefrontal
cortices (Raz, 2000; Resnick et al., 2003; Raz et al., 2005). Normal
aging also leads to a loss of dopamine receptor density (Li et al.,
2001). The striatum and prefrontal cortices, along with the mes-
encephalic dopamine system, are neural regions that have been
consistently implicated in reward-based decision-making (Mon-
tague et al., 1996; McClure et al., 2003; Daw et al., 2006; Daw
and Doya, 2006). Thus, the neurobiological changes associated
with aging affect areas implicated in decision-making, and it is
important to consider how these changes might affect behavior.
An additional distinction that has emerged in the decision-
making literature concerns brain regions implicated in the eval-
uation of immediate versus future consequences of each action.
The ventral striatum has often been linked to the evaluation
of immediate rewards (Hariri et al., 2006; McClure et al., 2007;
Samanez-Larkin et al., 2011), while areas of the prefrontal cor-
tices, particularly the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) have been associated with the evalu-
ation of delayed rewards (Winstanely et al., 2006; McClure et al.,
2007; Samanez-Larkin et al., 2011). Several behavioral studies that
have examined how age affects intertemporal choice have found
reduced delayed discounting in older adults (Green et al., 1994;
Lockenhoff, 2011; Lockenhoff et al., 2011). Thus, older adults may
focus more on the long-term beneﬁts of their actions, whereas
younger adults may focus more on immediate outcomes.
A recently proposed theory of cognitive aging, the scaffolding
theory of aging and cognition (STAC; Park and Reuter-Lorenz,
2009), suggests that older adults engage a broader network of
frontal areas to compensate for declines in a number of regions
(Cabeza et al., 2002; Reuter-Lorenz and Cappell, 2008; Cappell
et al., 2010). We propose that this frontal compensation leads
older adults to focus more on the delayed effects of each action,
rather than the immediate effects. This should lead older adults
to outperform younger adults in choice-dependent situations, but
underperform, relative to younger adults, in choice-independent
situations. This is exactly what we found in a recent study (Wor-
thy et al., 2011), however, the age-based differences in the precise
computational mechanisms by which older and younger adults
make repeated decisions remains underexplored, and little work
has applied computational models to older and younger adults’
data to better understand these mechanisms.
In the current work we seek to ﬁll this gap by examining older
and younger adults’ behavior in choice-dependent and choice-
independent decision-making tasks, and by ﬁtting a series of
computationalmodels to each participant’s data that differ in their
assumptions about how participants make decisions in the task.
Increased frontal compensation in older adults may lead them
to employ explicit, heuristic-based strategies to a greater extent
than younger adults, who may show more use of less explicit,
reinforcement-learning (RL) strategies. Indeed, some recent work
suggests that older adults are more likely to make their decisions
based on simple heuristics than younger adults (e.g., Mata et al.,
2007; Castel et al., in press). To test these hypotheses we compare
the ﬁts of a heuristic-based, win-stay–lose-shift (WSLS) model
with ﬁts of two popular RL models that do not assume the use of
a heuristic strategy. We provide more details on the mechanisms
and assumptions of the models the next section. We ﬁrst explain
the mechanisms of each model and then discuss their different
assumptions.
COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF DECISION-MAKING
WSLS model
Win-stay–lose-shift models have been extensively used to model
decision-making behavior (Frank and Kong, 2008; Steyvers et al.,
2009; Lee et al., 2011; Otto et al., 2011). These models were origi-
nally developed for simple prediction tasks where the participant
chooses an option and receives a reward with a certain probabil-
ity, P, or does not receive a reward with a probability (1− P). It
assumes that participants will “stay” by picking the same option
on the next trial if they are rewarded (a “win” trial), or “shift” by
selecting another option on the next trial if they are not rewarded
(a “lose” trial).
In the tasks used in the present experiments participants select
from among four options on each trial and receive between 1 and
10 points. We develop aWSLS model for these tasks by having the
model assume that participants compare the reward received on
the present trial to the reward received on the previous trial. The
trial is a “win” trial if the reward on the present trial is equal to
or greater than the reward received on the previous trial, and the
trial is a “loss” trial if the reward on the present trial is less than
the reward received on the previous trial.
The WSLS model has two free parameters. The ﬁrst parameter
represents the probability of staying with the same option on the
next trial if the reward received on the current trial is equal to or
greater than the reward received on the previous trial:
P (ai , t |choicet−1 = ai&r(t − 1) ≥ r(t − 2)) = P(stay|win).
(1)
In Eq. 1 r represents the reward received on a given trial. The
probability of switching to another option following a win trial
is 1− P(stay|win). To determine a probability of selecting each of
the other three options we divide this probability by three, so that
the probabilities for selecting each option sum to one.
The second parameter represents the probability of shifting to
the other option on the next trial if the reward received on the
current trial is less than the reward received on the previous trial:
P
(
aj , t |choicet−1 = ai&r(t − 1) < r(t − 2)
) = P(shift|loss).
(2)
This probability is divided by three and assigned to each of
the other three options. The probability of staying with an option
following a “loss” is 1− P(shift|loss). Thus, this model assumes a
simple, heuristic-based strategy that requires the reward received
on the previous trial to be maintained in working memory (e.g.,
Otto et al., 2011).
RL models
Many common RL models used to account for decision-making
behavior in choice tasks operate by developing and updating
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expected reward values for each option, aj, on each trial, t. These
EVs are denoted here and elsewhere as EV(aj, t ). The EVs for each
option are used to determine the model’s probability for select-
ing each option. Action selection probabilities for each option are
computed via a Softmax decision rule:
P(ai , t ) = e
[θ·EV (ai ,t )]∑2
j=1 e[θ·EV (aj ,t )]
(3)
Here θ is an exploitation parameter that determines the degree
to which the option with the highest EV is chosen. As θ approaches
inﬁnity the highest valued option is chosen more often, and as θ
approaches 0 all options are chosen equally often.
Learning rules for the delta-rule and eligibility trace RL models
We ﬁt two models that have slight differences in the assumptions
regarding how EVs are updated on each trial. Both models use the
Softmax rule in Eq. 1 to determine the probability of selecting each
option. The Delta-Rule model assumes that the EV for the option
chosen on each trial, denoted as option i, is updated on each trial
using the following equation:
EV (ai , t + 1) = EV (ai , t ) + α · [r(t ) − EV (ai , t )] (4)
This model assumes that the expected values for each option
are updated only when that option is selected, and are based only
on the reward received immediately after making a choice. Learn-
ing is primarily mediated by a prediction error between the reward
received and the EV for the chosen option (the bracketed por-
tion of Eq. 2). The prediction is positive if the reward received
is larger than expected and negative if the reward received is less
than expected. Learning ismodulated by a learning rate, or recency
parameter (α), 0≤ α≤ 1, that weighs the degree to which partici-
pants update the EVs for each option based on the most recently
received rewards. As α approaches 1 greater weight is given to the
most recent rewards in updating EVs, indicative of more active
updating of EVs on each trial, and as α approaches 0 rewards are
given less weight in updating EVs. When α= 0 no learning takes
place, and EVs are not updated throughout the experiment from
their initial starting points, Q(ai, t 0). The Delta-Rule model has
been used in a number of studies, primarily when the rewards in
the environment are choice-independent (e.g., Sutton and Barto,
1998; Yechiam and Busemeyer, 2005; Daw et al., 2006; Worthy
et al., 2007; Otto et al., 2010).
The learning rule for the Delta-Rule model can be modiﬁed to
include eligibility traces (ET) which simply assert that participants
remember which options they have chosen in the recent past, and
that some of the credit from the reward received on each trial goes
to options chosen on previous trials, rather than all of the credit
going to only the option that was just chosen. The addition of
ETs in the ET model has often resulted in an improved ﬁt (Sutton
and Barto, 1998; Pan et al., 2005; Bogacz et al., 2007; Gureckis and
Love, 2009). The updating equation for the ET model is:
EV
(
aj , t + 1
) = EV (aj , t) + α · λj [r(t ) − EV (aj , t)] (5)
The model assumes that participants keep a memory for recent
actions, known as an ET. The ET for each option is denoted above
as, λj, and reﬂects how eligible each option is for learning.
On each trial, the ET, λj, for every option decays based on a
decay parameter, ζ, 0≤ ζ≤ 1:
λj = λj · ζ (6)
Additionally, each time an option is chosen the ET for that
option is incremented according to:
λj = λj + 1 (7)
Eligibility traces aremeant to assert that participants remember
which actions they have recently selected, and in this way recent
actions can be credited if they lead to increases in reward. Thus,
in the ET model traces for options that are not chosen continue
to decay and EVs are updated more based on recent rewards the
more often they are chosen (Eq. 7). To summarize, there are two
main differences between theDelta-Rule and ETmodels presented
above. First, the ETmodel incorporates ETs for recent actions, and
second, the ET model updates the EVs of all options on each trial
based on each option’s ET value, whereas the Delta-Rule model
only updates the EV for the chosen option. It should also be noted
that the Delta-Rule model is nested within the ET model, as the
ET model is identical to the Delta-Rule model when ζ= 0.
Age-based predictions for RL versus WSLS strategy use
We propose that utilizing a heuristic-based WSLS strategy will
engage frontal brain regions, while utilizing an RL strategy will
engage striatal brain regions. Older adults who engage in compen-
satory scaffolding should be more likely to utilize aWSLS strategy
than an RL strategy than younger adults. Evidence for this dis-
tinction in the neural areas that mediate these two different types
of strategies comes from many different sources. Reward predic-
tion errors from RL models similar to the one presented above
have been correlated with striatal activity in a number of studies
(Pagnoni et al., 2002; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Hare et al., 2008).
This suggests that EVs for each option may be updated in a more
implicit, proceduralized manner that is not dependent on explicit
processing (e.g., Frank and Claus, 2006; Frank et al., 2006).
In contrast, there is a large body of evidence that suggests that
the use of heuristics, or rules, is explicit and more frontally medi-
ated (e.g., Ashby et al., 1998; Maddox and Ashby, 2004; Ashby
and Maddox, 2005). Recently, Otto et al. directly compared the
ﬁts of a WSLS strategy with ﬁts of an Expectation-Matching
strategy, with assumptions similar to the RL models presented
above, to data from participants who performed a simple predic-
tion task under either single-task or dual-task conditions. Par-
ticipants who performed under single-task conditions showed
more evidence of being best ﬁt by the WSLS model, while par-
ticipants who performed the task along with a concurrent, WM
demanding task showed more evidence of being best ﬁt by the
Expectation-Matching model (Otto et al., 2011).
Based on the scaffolding theory outlined above, we predict
that, relative to younger adults, older adults will employ more
explicit strategies like WSLS due to frontal compensation. Thus,
older adults’ data should show more evidence of being best ﬁt by
the WSLS model, while younger adults’ data should show more
evidence of being best ﬁt by one of the RL models.
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In the following sections we present an experiment in which
older and younger adults performed either a choice-dependent or
choice-independent decision-making task.We thenpresent behav-
ioral results, followed by results of a modeling analysis where we
compare the ﬁts of theWSLS,Delta-Rule, and ETmodels, as well as
the ﬁts of a Baselinemodel that assumes random responding. This
Baseline model has three free parameters representing the proba-
bility of selecting three of the four options on any given trial. The
probability of selecting the fourth option is 1 minus the sum of
the probabilities of the three other options. This model assumes
random, stochastic responding. To foreshadow, we ﬁnd that the
ET and WSLS models provide the best ﬁt to the data. We directly
compare the ﬁts of these two models and ﬁnd that younger adults
show more evidence of being best ﬁt by the ET model than older
adults.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Fifty-six younger adults (18–23 years of age, M = 20.29; 9 male
and 19 female; Mean education= 15.34 years) were recruited
from the University of Texas community and 58 older adults
(60–82 years of age M = 69.71; 31 male and 18 female; Mean
education= 17.28 years) were recruited from the greater Austin
community. Participants were paid $10 per hour for participating.
Older adults were administered an extensive neuropsychological
testing battery to determine anymental declines not due to normal
aging (detailed below).
PROCEDURE
Neuropsychological testing session
Older adults were given a series of standardized neuropsycholog-
ical tests before being included in the study. The neuropsycho-
logical testing session was held separately and before the experi-
mental session. The battery of tests was designed to assess general
intellectual ability across three functional realms:memory (Wech-
sler Memory Scale Third Edition (WMS-III) subtests: Wechsler,
1997; California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT): Delis et al., 1987),
mood (Geriatric Depression Scale, GDS: Brink et al., 1982), and
executive functioning and mental ﬂexibility [Stroop Color–Word
Test: Stroop, 1935; Trail Making Test A&B (TMT): Lezak, 1995;
Controlled Oral Word Association (COWA): Lezak, 1995; Wis-
consin Card Sorting Task (WCST): Heaton, 1981]. The tests were
administered in a single 2 h session, in the same basic order to
all subjects. The delay period of these tests was kept constant,
and was comprised of other tests not requiring any long-term
memory storage. The testing order was: CVLT, GDS, WAIS-
III Information subtest, WAIS-III Arithmetic subtest, WAIS-III
Vocabulary subtest, CVLT delayed-recall, WMS-III Logical Mem-
ory subtest, Stroop, TMT A&B, WAIS-III Similarities subtest,
COWA, WAIS-III Digit Span subtest, WMS-III Logical Mem-
ory delayed-recall, WMS-III Visual Reproduction subtest, WAIS-
III Letter/Numbering Sequencing subtest, WCST computerized
version,WMS-III Visual Reproduction delayed-recall.
The standard, age appropriate, published norms were used to
calculate normative scores for each subject. For all of the WAIS
subtests, the percentile was calculated according to testing instruc-
tions, and this score was then converted to a standardized z-score.
For the Stroop, CVLT, and WCST standardized t -scores were cal-
culated according to testing directions, and this score was then
converted to a standardized z-score. Finally, for the TMT and
COWA standard z-scores were calculated according to the test-
ing instructions. Older adults who had z-scores on two or more
tests in the same functional realm that were 2 SD below the mean
were not asked to participate in the study.
Experimental session
Each participant completed one of two decision-making tasks
where all options led to gains in points and the goal was to max-
imize points gained. The two tasks had the same basic surface
features and differed only on how the rewards for each option
were structured. Figure 1 shows a series of sample screen shots
from the tasks. Each task was 80 trials long, and participants made
a choice and received between 1 and 10points on each trial. Partici-
pants performed either a choice-independent or choice-dependent
tasks. The tasks used in the Experiment were four-deck versions of
tasks used in a previous paper from our lab (Worthy et al., 2007).
The reward structures were modiﬁed from two-deck four-deck
versions by simply adding one of each type of deck.
The rewards given for each deck in the choice-independent
task are shown in Figure 2. There were two “A” decks that gave
the same reward for a given trial, and two “B” decks that gave the
same reward for a given trial. The A decks gave lower rewards over
FIGURE 1 |Timeline of two possible trials in the experiment. On each
trial participants received between 1 and 10 points after selecting each
option.
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FIGURE 2 | Reward structure for the choice-independent task. Points
given were based on the trial number, rather than participants’ previous
behavior.
the ﬁrst 50 trials of the task, but higher rewards over the ﬁnal 30
trials of the task. The B decks gave higher rewards over the ﬁrst 50
trials of the task, and lower rewards over the ﬁnal 30 trials of the
task. Optimal performance on the task required identifying and
exploiting the decks that the largest gain or the smallest loss over
the course of the task. The best strategy was to exploit one of the
B Decks for the ﬁrst 50 trials and to then switch to exploiting one
of the A Decks for the ﬁnal 30 trials. Participants were given a goal
of earning at least 550 points by the end of the experiment. To
accomplish this goal the best deck had to be exploited on approx-
imately 90% of the trials in order for the goal criterion to be met.
At the end of the session participants were told whether or not
they met the goal.
The reward structure for the choice-dependent task is shown
in Figure 3A. In the choice-independent task the rewards were a
function of the trial number (as seen on the x-axis of Figure 2),
but in the choice-dependent the rewards were based on how
many cards have already been drawn from either the increas-
ing or decreasing decks (cf. x-axis for Figure 3A). In this task
there were two different types of decks: increasing decks and
decreasing decks, and there were two of each type. The increas-
ing decks gave poorer reward values at the beginning of the task,
but better values as more cards were drawn from them. In con-
trast, the decreasing decks gave good values at the beginning
of the tasks, but poorer values as more cards were drawn from
them. The two increasing decks and the two decreasing decks
were yoked, and separate counters were kept for each type of
deck. Each time a card was drawn from one of the two increas-
ing (or decreasing) decks the counter would increase by one and
this number would be equivalent to the value on the x-axis of
Figure 3A1.
Participants were given a goal of earning at least 450 points
by the end of the experiment. The goal criterion was determined
1It should be noted that the choice-dependent task is formally a partially observable
Markov decision process (POMDP). Some research in machine learning suggests
that the inclusion of ETs can help RL models cope with partial observability (e.g.,
Loch and Singh, 1998).
FIGURE 3 | (A) Reward structure for the choice-dependent task. Points
given were based on how many times participants had drawn from each
type of deck. Separate counters were kept for the increasing and
decreasing decks. (B) Plot of the points participants would earn based on
the number of draws from the increasing decks.
so that participants had to draw a minimum of 25 cards from
the increasing decks to meet the criterion in each task. The total
points earned for the gains task can be plotted as a function of the
number of cards drawn from the increasing decks. This is shown
in Figure 3B.
The speciﬁc instructions participants received before perform-
ing the choice-independent task are shown below. The instruc-
tions were the same for participants who performed the choice-
dependent task except participants were told that their goal was to
earn 450, not 550, points.
Speciﬁc instructions. You will perform a gambling task where
you will be asked to make selections from one of four options.
After each selection you will gain a certain number of points. Your
objective is to gain as many points as possible. You will have a spe-
ciﬁc goal to earn a certain number of points by the end of the task.
When you begin the task your goal will be listed on the screen. Try
your best to earn as many points as possible.
Four decks will appear on the screen. You will use the “W,”“Z,”
“P,” and “?/” keys to pick from these decks.
Press the “W” key to pick from the deck on the top left.
Press the “Z” key to pick from the deck on the bottom left.
Press the “P” key to pick from the deck on the top right.
Press the “?/” key to pick from the deck on the bottom right.
You will receive between 1 and 10 points each time you draw a
card. Your goal is to earn at least 550 points by the end of the
task.
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RESULTS
PERFORMANCE
We ﬁrst examined performance in each task by computing each
participant’s payoff relative to the payoff obtained by an opti-
mal performer. This proportion of the optimal cumulative payoff
was computed by dividing the points earned by each partici-
pant by the maximum number of points that could be earned
by an omniscient observer (600 in the choice-independent task
and 515 in the choice-dependent task). The proportions of the
optimal cumulative payoff are shown in Figure 4. A 2 (Age)× 2
(Task) ANOVA showed no main effect of age or for task, however
there was a signiﬁcant age× task interaction, F(1,110)= 12.96,
P < 0.001,η2 = 0.11.We conducted pair-wise comparisons within
each task to investigate the locus of the interaction. Within the
choice-independent task there was a signiﬁcant effect of age,
F(1,57)= 5.42, P < 0.05, η2 = 0.09. Younger adults (M = 0.87)
earned a signiﬁcantly higher proportion of the optimal cumulative
payoff than older adults (M = 0.84). There was also a main effect
of age in the choice-dependent task, F(1,53)= 7.92, P < 0.01,
η2 = 0.13. Older adults (M = 0.86) outperformed younger adults
in this task (M = 0.83). Thus younger adults performed better on
the choice-independent task, and older adults performed better
on the choice-dependent task.
MODEL-BASED RESULTS
We ﬁt each participant’s data individually with the WSLS, Delta-
Rule, ET, and the Baseline models detailed above. The models
were ﬁt to the choice data from each trial by maximizing negative
log-likelihood. We used Akaike weights to compare the relative
ﬁt of each model (Akaike, 1974; Wagenmakers and Farrell, 2004).
Akaike weights are derived from Akaike’s information criterion
(AIC) which is used to compare models with different numbers of
free parameters. AIC penalizes models with more free parameters.
For each model, i, AIC is deﬁned as:
AICi = −2LogLi + 2Vi (8)
where Li is the maximum likelihood for model i, and Vi is the
number of free parameters in the model. Smaller AIC values indi-
cate a better ﬁt to the data. We ﬁrst computed AIC values for each
FIGURE 4 | Average proportion of the optimal cumulative payoff
earned by participants in each condition.
model and for each participant’s data. Akaike weights were then
calculated to obtain a continuous measure of goodness-of-ﬁt. A
difference score is computed by subtracting the AIC of the best
ﬁtting model for each data set from the AIC of each model for the
same data set:
Δi(AIC) = AICi − minAIC (9)
From the differences in AIC we then computed the relative
likelihood, L, of each model, i, with the transform:
L (Mi |data) ∝ exp
{
−1
2
Δi(AIC)
}
(10)
Finally, the relative model likelihoods are normalized by divid-
ing the likelihood for each model by the sum of the likelihoods for
all models. This yields Akaike weights:
wi(AIC) = exp
{− 12Δi(AIC)}
exp
{− 12Δk(AIC)} (11)
These weights can be interpreted as the probability that the
model is the best model given the data set and the set of candidate
models (Wagenmakers and Farrell, 2004).
We computed the Akaike weights for each model for each
participant. Table 1 shows the average Akaike weights for par-
ticipants in each condition. Akaike weights were highest for the
ET model for younger adults across both tasks. Older adults’
had higher Akaike weights for the WSLS model in the choice-
independent task, although the ET model also provided a good ﬁt
to the data. Akaike weights were highest for the ET model for
older adults in the choice-dependent task, although the WSLS
model also provided a good ﬁt to the data. The Akaike weights
for the Delta-Rule model were lower than the weights for the
ET model across all four conditions, indicating that adding ETs
provided a better ﬁt to the data. The baseline model did not pro-
vide a good ﬁt to the data compared to the ﬁt of the two TD
models.
We can conclude from Table 1 that the ET and WSLS models
provided the best ﬁt to the data. We next compared the ﬁts of the
ETmodel andWSLSmodels directly for each participant to deter-
mine if participants were using a heuristic-based WSLS strategy,
or a more associative RL strategy. To obtain a relative measure of
the degree to which the ET model provided a better ﬁt to the data
Table 1 | Akaike weights for each model.
WSLS Delta-rule ET Baseline
CHOICE-INDEPENDENT TASK
Older adults 0.44 (0.08) 0.19 (0.03) 0.37 (0.06) 0 (0)
Younger adults 0.34 (0.08) 0.23 (0.04) 0.43 (0.06) 0 (0)
CHOICE-DEPENDENT TASK
Older adults 0.36 (0.08) 0.21 (0.04) 0.40 (0.06) 0.02 (0.01)
Younger adults 0.19 (0.07) 0.31 (0.04) 0.48 (0.05) 0.02 (0.02)
SEM are listed in parentheses.
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than theWSLSmodel we subtracted theAIC of the ETmodel from
the AIC of the WSLS (Relative ﬁtET = lnLWSLS − lnLET), for each
participant’s data. Because lower log-likelihood values indicate a
better ﬁt, positive Relative ﬁtET values indicate a better ﬁt for the
ET model, while negative Relative ﬁtET values indicate a better ﬁt
for the WSLS model.
These Relative ﬁtET values are plotted in Figure 5. A 2 (Age)× 2
(Task) ANOVA showed a main effect of age, F(1,53)= 4.19,
P < 0.05, η2 = 0.04. Younger adults (11.63) had higher Relative
ﬁtET values than older adults (M = 1.10), indicating more use a of
an RL strategy than a heuristic-based WSLS strategy for younger
adults. Relative ﬁtET values were near 0 for older adults, indicating
equal evidence for both models.
We next examined whether there was a relationship between
the Relative ﬁtET values and proportions of the optimal cumu-
lative payoff obtained in the choice-independent and choice-
dependent tasks. For the choice-independent task there was a
signiﬁcant positive correlation between Relative ﬁtET values and
the proportions of optimal cumulative payoff (r = 0.37,P < 0.01).
We examined these correlations within the younger and older
adults groups. There was a signiﬁcant positive correlation between
Relative ﬁtET values and proportions of the optimal cumula-
tive payoff within the older adults group (r = 0.41, P < 0.05).
The correlation between Relative ﬁtET values and proportions
of the optimal cumulative payoff was also positive, but only
marginally signiﬁcant within the younger adult group (r = 0.26,
P < 0.10).
Across all participants in the choice-dependent task there was
a signiﬁcant negative correlation between Relative ﬁtET values
and the proportions of optimal cumulative payoff (r =−0.43,
P < 0.001). This correlation was negative, but did not reach signif-
icance for the older adults (r =−0.14, P > 0.10). The correlation
between Relative ﬁtET values and the proportions of optimal
cumulative payoff was negative and highly signiﬁcant for younger
adults (r =−0.58, P < 0.001).
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL TEST RESULTS AND STRATEGY USE
We examined the older adult data from the neuropsychological
testing session to determine if therewere any relationships between
scores on those tests and strategy use in the decision-making tasks.
We ﬁrst examined correlations between the scores on each neu-
ropsychological test for older adults, and the proportions of the
optimal cumulative payoff they earned aswell as their Relative ﬁtET
values. However, none of these correlations reached signiﬁcance
(all P > 0.10).
We next split up the data based on whether older adult partici-
pants’datawere best ﬁt by theETorWSLSmodel. Thirty-twoolder
adults were ﬁt better by the WSLS model and 26 were ﬁt better by
the ET model. We examined the average z-scores from the neu-
ropsychological tests for participants who were best ﬁt by each of
thesemodels. There were two test variables for which scores signif-
icantly differed between these two groups: the CVLT’s recognition
for true positives score, t (55)=−2.05, P < 0.05, and the WCST’s
number of categories score, t (55)=−2.06, P < 0.05. Scores on
both of these measures were higher for older adults who were best
ﬁt by theWSLS model compared to older adults who were best ﬁt
by the ET model (CVLT:WSLS M = 0.40, ET M =−0.02; WCST:
WSLS M = 0.62, ET M =−0.05). Interestingly, z-scores for these
two neuropsychological measures were not correlated (r =−0.07,
P > 0.10).
The CVLT recognition for true positives test requires yes/no
recognition of items presented earlier and has been linked to
frontal lobe functioning. For example, patients with frontal lobe
dysfunction have been found to underperform on this test rela-
tive to normal controls (Baldo et al., 2002). The WCST has been
shown to activate the DLPFC to store earlier events in working
memory and the mid-ventrolateral prefrontal cortex to signal the
need for a mental shift in response to a new set (Monchi et al.,
2001). Thus, while this analysis is only exploratory, the ﬁndings of
superior performance on two neuropsychological tests related to
frontal lobe functioning for older adults whose data were best ﬁt
FIGURE 5 | Average Relative fitET values for participants in each condition. Positive values indicate a better ﬁt for the ET model, while negative values
indicate a better ﬁt for theWSLS model.
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by the WSLS model is consistent with the hypothesis that a WSLS
strategy is more frontally mediated.
DISCUSSION
We observed an interaction between age and the nature of the
optimal task strategy on performance. Older adults performed
better when rewards were choice-dependent, while younger adults
performed better when rewards were choice-independent. This
replicates our previous ﬁnding in the same choice-independent
task, and mirrors our previous ﬁndings for two different choice-
dependent tasks (Worthy et al., 2011). We ﬁt the data with four
different mathematical models to better characterize the behavior
of younger and older adults when performing these tasks. Overall
an RL model that included ETs provided the best ﬁt to the data,
although a WSLS model provided a good ﬁt as well, particularly
for older adults who performed the choice-independent task.
A direct comparison of the ET and WSLS model ﬁts showed
more evidence of WSLS strategy use for older adults than younger
adults. Participants who were better ﬁt by the ET model, rela-
tive to the ﬁt of the WSLS model, tended to perform better on
the choice-independent task, but worse on the choice-dependent
task. A WSLS strategy may lead to sub-optimal switches from the
most-rewarding options in the choice-independent task due to
variation around themean value given by each deck. A participant
may switch to a different deck after receiving less on the current
trial than what they received on the previous trial, even though
they may be switching to a deck with a lower overall mean reward
value. The ET model assumes that participants update and main-
tain EVs for each option. The EVs are essentially recency-weighted
averages of the rewards received on previous trials, and the model
predicts which option should be chosen by comparing the EV of
each option with the EVs of the other options. This model should
not predict as much switching from decks that give high aver-
age rewards because the decks are valued based on the average
rewards received over many trials, rather than a relative compar-
ison between the current reward and the reward received on the
preceding trial.
A WSLS strategy likely helps on the choice-dependent task
because participants are less likely to stay with the Decreasing
options, andwill select the Increasing optionsmore due to the vari-
ation in rewards around each deck’s mean reward value. A WSLS
strategy should also lead participants to switch away from the
Decreasing options quicker once the rewards given by theDecreas-
ing options begin to decline. An RL strategy will consistently value
the Decreasing option early in the task because selecting it leads
to larger average rewards. Because the EVs are recency-weighted
averages of the rewards received for each option,participants using
this type of strategy will pick the Increasing option less often early
in the task, leading to poorer overall performance.
Thus, the age-based differences in performance on the choice-
independent and choice-dependent tasks were due to differences
in the types of strategies older and younger adults used to make
their decisions on each trial, with older adults using a heuristic-
based WSLS more often than younger adults. Other work also
suggests that older adults may be more likely to use simple heuris-
tics during decision-making than younger adults (Thornton and
Dumke, 2005; Mata et al., 2007; Peters et al., 2007; Castel et al.,
in press). For example, Castel et al. (in press) recently found that
older adults showedhigher endorsement of the“hot-hand”heuris-
tic in basketball than younger adults (i.e., the rule that the player
who has made his/her last few shots should shoot the ball). Older
participants in our experiment showed a similar preference for a
heuristic-based WSLS strategy based on a comparison of the cur-
rent andprevious rewards,over anRL strategy that favored options
with large expected reward values.
The differences in strategy preferences that we observed could
be due to a shift in the neural areas recruited during decision-
making, as predicted by STAC (Park and Reuter-Lorenz, 2009).
A WSLS strategy may be more demanding of WM and executive
attention resources than an RL strategy, which is more striatally
mediated and less demanding of working memory and executive
attention resources (Frank and Claus, 2006; Frank et al., 2006;
Otto et al., 2011). Participants performing a concurrent work-
ing memory demanding task have been shown to be better ﬁt by
an expectation-matching model, similar to the RL models used
here, relative to a WSLS model (Otto et al., 2011). While frontal
compensation could be a cause for the age-based difference in
strategy use, older adults may have also learned from life expe-
rience that the use of heuristics can often be an adaptive and
useful way of making decisions (e.g., Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999;
Broder, 2003; Scheibehenne et al., 2011). Indeed the use of aWSLS
strategy was adaptive in the choice-dependent task as it led par-
ticipants away from repeatedly selecting the Decreasing options.
Older adults’ greater experience in advantageously using heuris-
tics in decision-making situations may have led them to prefer
such strategies more than younger adults in our decision-making
tasks.
CONCLUSION
This study applied a series of mathematical models to data
from younger and older adults who performed either a choice-
dependent or choice-independent decision-making task. Older
adults showedmore evidence of utilizing aWSLS heuristic tomake
decisions than younger adults, who were best ﬁt by an RL model
that tracked recency-weighted averages of each option based on
prediction errors. These results suggest that older and younger
adults use qualitatively different strategies to make decisions, and
that the shift in strategies may results from older adults engaging
more frontal brain regions to compensate for age-based neural
declines (Park and Reuter-Lorenz, 2009), and the greater expe-
rience of older adults in successfully using heuristics to make
decisions.
REFERENCES
Akaike, H. (1974). A new look at
the statistical model identiﬁcation.
IEEE Trans. Automat. Contr. 19,
716–723.
Ashby, F. G., Alfonso-Reese, L. A.,
Turken, A. U., and Waldron, E. M.
(1998). A neuropsychological the-
ory of multiple systems in category
learning. Psychol. Rev. 105, 442–481.
Ashby, F. G., and Maddox,W. T. (2005).
Human category learning. Annu.
Rev. Psychol. 56, 149–178.
Baldo, J. V., Delis, D., Kramer, J.,
and Shimamura, A. P. (2002).
Memory performance on the Cal-
ifornia Verbal Learning Test-II:
ﬁndings from patients with focal
lesions. J. Int. Neuropsychol. Soc. 8,
539–546.
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience January 2012 | Volume 5 | Article 145 | 8
Worthy and Maddox Modeling aging and decision-making
Bogacz, R., McClure, S. M., Li, J.,
Cohen, J. D., and Montague, P. R.
(2007). Short-term memory traces
for action bias in human rein-
forcement learning. Brain Res. 1153,
111–121.
Brink, T. L., Yesavage, J. A., Lum, O.,
Heersema, P. H., Adey,M., and Rose,
T. L. (1982). Screening tests for geri-
atric depression. Clin. Gerontol. 1,
37–43.
Broder,A. (2003).Decisionmakingwith
the “adaptive toolbox”. Inﬂuence
of environmental structure, intelli-
gence, and working memory load. J.
Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 29,
611–625.
Brown, S. B. R. E., and Ridderinkhof,
K. R. (2009). Aging and the neu-
roeconomics of decision-making.
Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 9,
365–379.
Cabeza, R., Anderson, N. D., Locan-
tore, J. K., and McIntosh, A.
R. (2002). Aging gracefully: com-
pensatory brain activity in high-
performing older adults. Neuroim-
age 17, 1394–1402.
Cappell, K. A., Gmeindl, L., and Reuter-
Lorenz, P. A. (2010). Age differ-
ences in prefrontal recruitment dur-
ing verbal working memory main-
tenance depend on memory load.
Cortex 46, 462–473.
Castel, A. D., Rossi, A. D., and
McGillivray, S. (in press). Beliefs
about the “hot hand” in Basketball
across the adult lifespan. Psychol.
Aging.
Cohen, J. E. (2003). Human population:
the next half century. Science 302,
1172–1175.
Daw, N. D., and Doya, K. (2006).
The computational neurobiology of
learning and reward. Curr. Opin.
Neurobiol. 16, 199–204.
Daw, N. D., O’Doherty, J. P., Dayan, P.,
Seymour, B., and Dolan, R. J. (2006).
Cortical substrates for exploratory
decisions in humans. Nature 441,
876–879.
Delis, D. C., Kramer, J. H., Kaplan,
E., and Ober, B. A. (1987). Califor-
nia Verbal Learning Test: Adult Ver-
sion Manual. San Antonio, TX: The
Psychological Corporation.
Denburg, N. L., Tranel, D., and
Bechara, A. (2005). The ability
to decide advantageously declines
prematurely in some normal older
persons. Neuropsychologia 43,
1099–1106.
Frank, M. J., and Claus, E. D.
(2006). Anatomy of a decision:
striato-orbitofrontal interactions in
reinforcement learning, decision-
making, and reversal. Psychol. Rev.
113, 300–326.
Frank,M. J., andKong,L. (2008). Learn-
ing to avoid in older age. Psychol.
Aging 23, 392–398.
Frank,M. J., O’Reilly, R. C., and Curran,
T. (2006). When memory fails, intu-
ition reigns: midazolam enhances
implicit inference in humans. Psy-
chol. Sci. 17, 700–707.
Gigerenzer, G., and Todd, P. M.
(1999). “Fast and frugal heuristics:
the adaptive tool box,” in Sim-
ple Heuristics that Make us Smart,
eds G. Gigerenzer, P. Todd, and
the ABC Research Group (New
York: Oxford University Press),
3–34.
Green, L., Fry, A. F., and Myerson,
J. (1994). Discounting of delayed
rewards: a life span comparison. Psy-
chol. Sci. 5, 33–36.
Gureckis, T. M., and Love, B. C.
(2009). Learning in noise: dynamic
decision-making in a variable envi-
ronment. J. Math. Psychol. 53,
180–193.
Hare, T. A., O’Doherty, J., Camerer,
C. F., Schultz, W., and Rangel, A.
(2008). Dissociating the role of the
orbitofrontal cortex and the stria-
tum in the computation of goal val-
ues and prediction errors. J. Neu-
rosci. 28, 5623–5630.
Hariri, A. R., Brown, S. M.,Williamson,
D. E., Flory, J. D., de Wit, H., and
Manuck, S. B. (2006). Preference for
immediate over delayed reward is
associated with magnitude of ven-
tral striatal activity. J. Neurosci. 20,
13213–13217.
Heaton, R. K. (1981). A Manual for
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test.
Odessa, FL: Psychological Assess-
ment Resources.
Kovalchik, S., Camerer, C. F., Grether,
D. M., Plott, C. R., and Allman, J.
M. (2004). Aging and decision mak-
ing: a comparison between neuro-
logically healthy elderly and young
individuals. J. Econ. Behav. Organ.
58, 79–94.
Kuhnen, C. M., and Knutson, B. (2005).
The neural basis of ﬁnancial risk-
taking. Neuron 47, 763–770.
Lee, M. D., Zhang, S., Munro, M., and
Steyvers, M. (2011). Psychological
models of human and optimal per-
formance in bandit problems. Cogn.
Syst. Res. 12, 164–174.
Lezak, M. D. (1995). Neuropsychologi-
cal Assessment, 3rd Edn. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Li, S. C., Biele, G., Lindenberger, U., and
Sikstrom,S. (2001).Aging cognition:
from neuromodulation to represen-
tation. Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.)
5, 97–111.
Loch, J., and Singh, S. P. (1998).
“Using eligibility traces to ﬁnd
the best memoryless policy in
partially observable Markov deci-
sion processes,” in Proceedings of
the Fifteenth International Confer-
ence on Machine Learning, Madison,
323–331.
Lockenhoff, C. E. (2011). Age, time,
and decision making: from process-
ing speed to global time horizons.
Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 1235, 44–56.
Lockenhoff, C. E., O’Donoghue, T., and
Dunning, D. (2011). Age differences
in temporal discounting: the role
of dispositional affect and antici-
pated emotions. Psychol. Aging 26,
274–284.
Maddox, W. T., and Ashby, F. G.
(2004). Dissociating explicit and
procedural-learning systems of per-
ceptual category learning. Behav.
Processes 66, 309–332.
Mata, R., Schooler, L. J., and Rieskamp,
J. (2007). The aging decision maker:
cognitive aging and the adaptive
selection of decision strategies. Psy-
chol. Aging 22, 796–810.
McClure, S. M., Berns, G. S., and Mon-
tague, P. R. (2003). Temporal predic-
tion errors in a passive learning task
activate human striatum.Neuron 38,
329–337.
McClure, S. M., Ericson, K.M., Laibson,
D. I., Loewenstein, G., and Cohen,
J. D. (2007). Time discounting for
primary rewards. J. Neurosci. 27,
5796–5804.
Mell, T., Heekeren, H. R., Marschner,
A., Wartenburger, I., Villringer, A.,
and Reischies, F. M. (2005). Effects
of aging on stimulus-reward associ-
ation learning. Neuropsychologia 43,
554–563.
Mell, T., Wartenburger, I., Marschner,
A., Villringer, A., Reischies, F. M.,
and Heekeren, H. R. (2009). Altered
function of ventral striatum during
reward-based decision-making in
old age. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 3:34.
doi:10.3389/neuro.09.034.2009.
Monchi,O.,Petrides,M.,Petre,V.,Wors-
ley, K., and Dagher, A. (2001). Wis-
consin Card Sorting revisited: dis-
tinct neural circuits participating in
different stages of the task identiﬁed
by event-related functional mag-
netic resonance imaging. J. Neurosci.
21, 7733.
Montague, P. R., Dayan, P., and
Sejnowski, T. J. (1996). A frame-
work for mesencephalic dopamine
systems based on predictiveHebbian
learning. J. Neurosci. 16, 1936–1947.
Otto, A. R., Markman, A. B., Gureckis,
T. M., and Love, B. C. (2010). Regu-
latory ﬁt and systematic exploration
in a dynamic decision-making envi-
ronment. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn.
Mem. Cogn. 36, 797–804.
Otto, A. R., Taylor, E. G., and Mark-
man, A. B. (2011). There are at
least two kinds of probabilitymatch-
ing: evidence from a secondary task.
Cognition 118, 274–279.
Pagnoni G., Zink C. F., Montague P. R.,
and Berns G. S. (2002). Acitivity in
the human ventral striatum locked
to errors of reward prediction. Nat.
Neurosci. 5, 97–98.
Pan, W. X., Schmidt, R., Wickens, J. R.,
and Hyland, B. I. (2005). Dopamine
cells respond to predicted events
during classical conditioning: evi-
dence for eligibility traces in the
reward-learning network. J. Neu-
rosci. 25, 6235–6242.
Park, D. C., and Reuter-Lorenz, P.
(2009). The adaptive brain: aging
and neurocognitive scaffolding.
Annu. Rev. Psychol. 60, 173–196.
Pessiglione, M., Seymour, B., Flandin,
G., Dolan, R. J., and Frith, C. D.
(2006). Dopamine-dependent pre-
diction errors underpin reward-
seeking behavior in humans. Nature
442, 1042–1045.
Peters, E., Hess, T. M., Vastfjall,
D., and Auman, C. (2007). Adult
age differences in dual informa-
tion processes: implications for the
role of affective and deliberative
processes in older adults’ decision
making. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 2,
1–23.
Raz, N. (2000). “Aging of the brain and
its impact on cognitive performance:
integration of structural and func-
tional ﬁndings,” in The Handbook of
Aging and Cognition, eds F. Craik
and T. A. Satlhouse (Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum), 1–90.
Raz, N., Linberger, U., Rodrique, K.
M., Kennedy, K. M., Head, D.,
Williamson, A., Dahle, C., Gerstorf,
D., and Acker, J. D. (2005). Regional
brain differences in aging healthy
adults: general trends, individual dif-
ferences andmodiﬁers.Cereb. Cortex
15, 1676–1689.
Resnick,S.M.,Pham,D. L.,Kraut,M.A.,
Zonderman, A. B., and Davatzikos,
C. (2003). Longitudinal magnetic
resonance imaging studies of older
adults: a shrinking brain. J. Neurosci.
23, 3295–3301.
Reuter-Lorenz, P. A., and Cappell, K.
A. (2008). Neurocognitive aging and
the compensation hypothesis. Curr.
Dir. Psychol. Sci. 17, 177–182.
Samanez-Larkin, G. R., Gibbs, S. E. B.,
Khanna, K., Nielsen, L., Carstensen,
L. L., and Knutson, B. (2007). Antic-
ipation of monetary gain bus not
loss in healthy older adults. Nat.
Neurosci. 10, 787–791.
Samanez-Larkin, G. R., Kuhnen, C. K.,
Yoo, D. J., and Knutson, B. (2010).
www.frontiersin.org January 2012 | Volume 5 | Article 145 | 9
Worthy and Maddox Modeling aging and decision-making
Variability in nucleus accumbens
activity mediates age-related subop-
timal ﬁnancial risk-taking. J. Neu-
rosci. 30, 1426–1434.
Samanez-Larkin, G. R., Wagner, A. D.,
and Knutson, B. (2011). Expected
value information improves ﬁnan-
cial risk taking across the adult life
span. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 6,
207–217.
Scheibehenne,B.,Wilke,A., andTodd,P.
M. (2011). Expectations of clumpy
resources inﬂuence predictions of
sequential events. Evol. Hum. Behav.
32, 326–333.
Schott, B. H., Niehaus, L., Wittman,
B. C., Schutze, H., Seidenbecher,
C. I., Heinze, H. J., and Duzel,
E. (2007). Ageing and early-stage
Parkinson’s disease affect separa-
ble neural mechanisms of mesolim-
bic reward processing. Brain 130,
2412–2424.
Steyvers, M., Lee, M. D., and Wagen-
makers, E. J. (2009). A Bayesian
analysis of human decision-making
onbandit problems. J.Math. Psychol.
53, 168–179.
Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interfer-
ence in serial verbal reactions. J. Exp.
Psychol. 18, 643–662.
Sutton, R. S., and Barto, A. G. (1998).
Reinforcement Learning: An Intro-
duction. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Thornton, W. J. L., and Dumke,
H. A. (2005). Age differences in
everyday problem-solving and
decision-making effectiveness: a
meta-analytic review. Psychol. Aging
20, 85–99.
Wagenmakers, E. J., and Farrell, S.
(2004). AIC model selection using
Akaike weights. Psychon. Bull. Rev.
11, 192–196.
Wechsler, D. (1997). Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale, 3rd Edn. San
Antonio: Harcourt Brace &
Company.
Winstanely, C. A., Dalley, J. W.,
Theobald, D. E., and Robbins,
T. W. (2006). Double dissoci-
ation between serotonergic and
dopaminergic modulation of pre-
frontal and orbitofrontal cortex dur-
ing a test of impulsive choice. Cereb.
Cortex 16, 106–114.
Wood, S., Busemeyer, J., Koling, A.,
Davis, H., and Cox, C. R. (2005).
Older adults as adaptive decision-
makers: evidence from the Iowa
Gambling Task. Psychol. Aging 20,
220–225.
Worthy, D. A., Gorlick, M. A., Pacheco,
J. L., Schnyer, D. M., and Mad-
dox, W. T. (2011). With age comes
wisdom: decision-making in older
and younger adults. Psychol. Sci. 22,
1375–1380.
Worthy, D. A., Maddox, W. T., and
Markman, A. B. (2007). Regulatory
ﬁt effects in a choice task. Psychon.
Bull. Rev. 14, 1125–1132.
Yechiam,E., andBusemeyer, J. R. (2005).
Comparison of basic assumptions
embedded in learning models
for experience based decision-
making. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 12,
387–402.
Conﬂict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any com-
mercial or ﬁnancial relationships that
could be construed as a potential con-
ﬂict of interest.
Received: 15 October 2011; accepted: 16
December 2011; published online: 06 Jan-
uary 2012.
Citation: Worthy DA and Maddox WT
(2012) Age-based differences in strategy
use in choice tasks. Front.Neurosci. 5:145.
doi: 10.3389/fnins.2011.00145
This article was submitted to Frontiers
in Decision Neuroscience, a specialty of
Frontiers in Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2012 Worthy and Mad-
dox. This is an open-access article dis-
tributed under the terms of the Cre-
ative Commons Attribution Non Com-
mercial License, which permits noncom-
mercial use, distribution, and repro-
duction in other forums, provided
the original authors and source are
credited.
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience January 2012 | Volume 5 | Article 145 | 10
